Wiretap and Gelfand-Pinsker Channels Analogy and its Applications by Goldfeld, Ziv & Permuter, Haim. H.
ar
X
iv
:1
71
2.
10
29
9v
2 
 [c
s.I
T]
  2
8 M
ay
 20
19
1
Wiretap and Gelfand-Pinsker Channels Analogy and
its Applications
Ziv Goldfeld and Haim H. Permuter
Abstract—An analogy framework between wiretap channels
(WTCs) and state-dependent point-to-point channels with non-
causal encoder channel state information (referred to as Gelfand-
Pinker channels (GPCs)) is proposed. A good sequence of stealth-
wiretap codes is shown to induce a good sequence of codes for
a corresponding GPC. Consequently, the framework enables ex-
ploiting existing results for GPCs to produce converse proofs for
their wiretap analogs. The analogy readily extends to multiuser
broadcasting scenarios, encompassing broadcast channels (BCs)
with deterministic components, degradation ordering between
users, and BCs with cooperative receivers. Given a wiretap BC
(WTBC) with two receivers and one eavesdropper, an analogous
Gelfand-Pinsker BC (GPBC) is constructed by converting the
eavesdropper’s observation sequence into a state sequence with
an appropriate product distribution (induced by the stealth-
wiretap code for the WTBC), and non-causally revealing the
states to the encoder. The transition matrix of the state-dependent
GPBC is extracted from WTBC’s transition law, with the
eavesdropper’s output playing the role of the channel state.
Past capacity results for the semi-deterministic (SD) GPBC and
the physically-degraded (PD) GPBC with an informed receiver
are leveraged to furnish analogy-based converse proofs for
the analogous WTBC setups. This characterizes the secrecy-
capacity regions of the SD-WTBC and the PD-WTBC, in which
the stronger receiver also observes the eavesdropper’s channel
output. These derivations exemplify how the wiretap-GP analogy
enables translating results on one problem into advances in the
study of the other.
Index Terms—Analogy, broadcast channel, Gelfand-Pinsker
channel, physical layer security, state-dependent channel, wiretap
channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
Two fundamental, yet seemingly unrelated, information-
theoretic models are the wiretap channel (WTC) and the state-
dependent point-to-point channel with non-causal encoder
channel state information (CSI). The discrete and memoryless
(DM) WTC (Fig. 1(a)) was introduced by Wyner in 1975 [1]
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Fig. 1: (a) The WTC pY,Z|X , whereX is the channel input and
Y and Z are the channel outputs observed by the legitimate
receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively; (b) The GPC with
state distribution Z ∼ qZ , and channel transition probability
qY |X,Z , where X is the input and Y is the output.
and initiated the study of physical layer security. Csisza´r and
Ko¨rner characterized the secrecy-capacity of the WTC [2] as
CWT(pY,Z|X) = max
pU,X
[
I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z)
]
, (1)
where pY,Z|X is the WTC’s transition matrix and the under-
lying distribution is pU,XpY,Z|X . The state-dependent channel
with non-causal encoder CSI is due to Gelfand and Pinsker
(GP) [3]; we henceforth refer to it as the GP channel (GPC)
and it is shown in Fig. 1(b). The capacity of a GPC qY |X,Z
with state distribution qZ is:
CGP(qZ , qY |X,Z) = max
qU,X|Z
[
I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z)
]
, (2)
where the joint distribution is qZqU,X|ZqY |X,Z . An interesting
question is whether the resemblance of (1) and (2) is co-
incidental or is there an inherent connection between these
problems.
A. The Analogy and its Implications
This paper shows that an inherent connection is indeed the
case by establishing a rigorous uni-directional relation between
the WTC and the GPC. Specifically, we prove that any good
sequence of stealth-wiretap codes for the WTC induces a good
sequence of codes of the same rate for a corresponding GPC.
This GPC depends both on the original WTC and on the
2deployed stealth-wiretap code. We add the stealth condition
[4], [5] to the regular security requirement of a vanishing
information leakage.1 This allows relating WTCs to GPCs with
i.i.d. state sequences (although our analogy framework is also
valid for arbitrary GP state distributions, in which case stealth
is not needed). The importance of the i.i.d. state sequence
scenario in the GP model stems from the fact that all known
single-letter GP capacity results are under this assumption; a
partial list includes [6]–[9]. The established relation enables
exploiting such known upper bounds on the GP capacity to
upper bound the secrecy-capacity of the analogous wiretap
model (when achievability is defined to include the stealth
requirement). While the solutions to the base cases from Fig. 1
have been known for decades, many multiuser extensions of
these models remain open problems. Through the analogy, we
derive converse proofs for several multiuser wiretap settings
which lead to new secrecy-capacity results.
To this end we extend the wiretap-GP analogy to mul-
tiuser broadcasting scenarios. Fix a wiretap broadcast channel
(WTBC) pY1,Y2,Z|X (Fig. 2(a)), with two legitimate receivers
observing Y1 and Y2 and one eavesdropper that intercepts Z .
Our stealth-wiretap codes for the WTBC ensure reliability,
security and stealth [4], [5]. Specifically, the latter requires that
the distribution of the eavesdropper’s observation sequence Z
is asymptotically indistinguishable from some target product
measure qnZ . Fixing a stealth-wiretap code for the WTBC, an
analogous GP broadcast channel (GPBC), shown in Fig. 2(b),
is constructed by:
1) Converting the eavesdropper’s observation Z to an in-
dependently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) state se-
quence, whose distribution is specified by the WTBC
stealth condition;
2) Non-causally revealing the state sequence to the en-
coder;
3) Setting pY1,Y2|X,Z (the conditional marginal of the
WTBC’s transition probability, with Z in the role of
the state) as the GPBC’s transition kernel.
The aforementioned claim relating good sequences of codes
for analogous WTBCs and GPBCs remains valid in this
extended framework. Through this relation we can capitalize
on known GPBC capacity results to derive converse bounds
for their analogous WTBCs.
The GPBC has been widely studied in the literature and the
capacity region is known for various cases. Notably, the semi-
deterministic (SD) GPBC was solved in [7], the physically
degraded (PD) GPBC with an informed receiver (i.e., when the
stronger receiver also observes the state sequence) was treated
in [8], and the cooperative version of this PD-GPBC, where
the receivers are connected via a unidirectional noiseless link,
was the focus of [9]. The corresponding (SD and PD) WTBCs
also received considerable attention in the literature [10]–[13];
however, solutions are known only for some special cases.
To the best of our knowledge, the widest framework of DM-
WTBCs for which tight secrecy-capacity results are available
1To the best of our knowledge, in all WTC models for which the secrecy-
capacity is known both without (e.g., weak- or strong-secrecy) and with a
stealth condition, the two capacity expressions coincide.
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Fig. 2: (a) The WTBC pY1,Y2,Z|X , where X is the channel
input and Y1, Y2 and Z are the channel outputs observed
by the legitimate receivers and the eavesdropper, respectively.
Secrecy and stealth are required versus the eavesdropper, i.e.,
that Z is asymptotically independent of the messages and
that its distribution, as induced by the code, approximates
a target product measure qnZ . (b) An analogous GPBC is
constructed by replacing the eavesdropper’s observation with
a state sequence Z ∼ qnZ , non-causally revealing Z to the
encoder and setting the state-dependent BC’s transition kernel
to pY1,Y2|X,Z , i.e., the conditional marginal distribution of the
WTBC’s law pY1,Y2,Z|X .
is due to [13], where the regions for the SD-WTBC and the
PD-WTBC were derived under the weak-secrecy metric, while
assuming that the stochastic receiver is less noisy than the
eavesdropper. The coding schemes therein does not rely on
this less-noisy property; the converse proofs, however, do.
As compared to WTBCs, GPBCs typically lend themselves
to easier converse proofs. This is due to the simpler statistical
relations between the random variables in GPBC setups.
Specifically, the state Z being i.i.d. and independent of the
messages is crucial for the converse proofs from [7]–[9]. In
contrast, the WTBC does not share these properties. When
Z is the eavesdropper’s observation sequence induced by
the code, it is generally not i.i.d., nor is it independent of
the message pair. This means that one cannot simply repeat
the steps from the converse proof of the analogous GPBC
when upper bounding the transmission rates achievable over a
WTBC. Nonetheless, our analogy-based proof method enables
exploiting the aforementioned GPBC results to characterize
the SD- and the PD-WTBC secrecy-capacity regions. As
opposed to [13], while our proof adds a stealth criterion to
3the WTBC code, it requires no less-noisiness assumptions
on the WTBC’s outputs. As a natural extension to the base
case (WTCs versus GPCs), the obtained WTBC regions are
described by the same rate bounds as their GPBC counterparts.
The goal of this work is to propose our analogy framework as
a new research tool for information-theoretic security and the
derived capacity results serve as demonstrations of its usage.
B. Dualities and Analogies in Information Theory
Connecting seemingly unrelated information-theoretic prob-
lems dates back to Shannon’s landmark 1959 paper [14],
where he observed the similarity between channel transmission
and lossy source compression. Shannon noticed that two lossy
source and channel coding problems that are obtainable from
one another by interchanging the roles of their encoder(s) and
decoder(s) have dual solutions. Channel and source duality
was widely studied ever since, with multiple extensions to
multiuser scenarios (a partial list of references is [15]–[23]);
numerous examples were found that support Shannon’s obser-
vation. However, a formal definition of this duality remains
elusive and, in the absence of a definition, a proof is out
of reach. Since there is no mechanism of formal inference
in place, channel-source duality is mainly used as a tool to
produce educated guesses of the solution of one problem,
provided the solution of the other.
An alternative and proven form of duality was estab-
lished between the Gaussian BC and multiple-access channels
(MACs) [24]. It was shown that if the channels have corre-
sponding gain and noise parameters, then the capacity-region
of one problem can be expressed in terms of the region of the
other. This duality was extended to multiple-antenna setups
in the followup work [25] and was used in [25], [26] to find
the sum capacity of the multiple-antenna BC. However, the
validity of this relation to broader (not necessarily Gaussian)
frameworks remains an open question. Analogical relations
between different problems were also observed before. In
particular, an analogy between Kelly Gambling [27] and work
extraction in statistical physics was the focus of [28].
Perhaps most relevant to our work is [29], which focuses on
the relation between GPCs and WTCs. This paper shows that
a good random coding ensemble generated by a fixed input
distribution for one problem gives rise to a good ensemble
for the other (claims in both directions are given). The results
assume that the wiretap and GP input distributions, the GP
state distribution and the two transition kernels jointly satisfy
certain information inequalities. Under these conditions the
cross-problem achievability claim holds by generally achieves
sub-optimal rates. The paper also identifies a further conditions
under which optimality is attained. It is noteworthy that
the approach from [29] relies on knowing the single-letter
solutions to both problems, which limits the application of
this framework to multiuser scenarios. Another work that hints
on the relation between GPCs and WTCs is [30], where
the secrecy-capacity of a GP-WTC (i.e., a state-dependent
WTC with non-causal encoder CSI) was upper bounded by
converting it into an enhanced WTC where the transmitter
controls the state bound to a type constraint. To the best of our
knowledge, the analogy paradigm established here is the first
proven relation between the operational setups of the wiretap
and GP coding scenarios, which requires no prior knowledge
of either solution. Like the aforementioned proven duality and
analogy relations, it constitutes a research tool that enables
inference of results from one problem to the other.
C. Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II provides notation, basic definitions and properties. In
Section III, we define the WTBC and the GPBC. Section IV
explains the analogy between WTCs and GPCs, and illustrates
how to use it to prove the converse of the WTC secrecy-
capacity (which equals the regular term from (1)). The same
section also extends the analogy to multiuser broadcasting
setups. In Section V we state the WTBC secrecy-capacity
results derived via the analogy, and cite the past results for
the corresponding GPBCs. Proofs are provided in Section VI,
while Section VII summarizes the main achievements and
insights of this work.
II. NOTATIONS AND PRELIMINARIES
We use the following notations. As is customary, N is the
set of natural numbers (which does not include 0), while R
denotes the reals. We further define R+ = {x ∈ R|x ≥ 0}
and R++ = {x ∈ R|x > 0}. Given two real numbers a, b, we
denote by [a : b] the set of integers
{
n ∈ N
∣∣⌈a⌉ ≤ n ≤ ⌊b⌋}.
Calligraphic letters denote sets, e.g., X , the complement of
X is denoted by X c, while |X | stands for its cardinality. Xn
denotes the n-fold Cartesian product of X . An element of Xn
is denoted by xn = (x1, x2, . . . , xn); whenever the dimension
n is clear from the context, vectors (or sequences) are denoted
by boldface letters, e.g., x. For any A ⊆ [1 : n], we use
xA = (xi)i∈A to denote the substring of x
n defined by A,
with respect to the natural ordering of A. For instance, for
1 ≤ i < j ≤ n, we have x[i:j] = (xi, xi+1, . . . , xj).
Let
(
X ,F ,P
)
be a probability space, where X is the sample
space, F is the σ-algebra and P is the probability measure.
Random variables over
(
X ,F ,P
)
are denoted by uppercase
letters, e.g., X , with conventions for random vectors similar
to those for deterministic sequences. The probability of an
event A ∈ F is denoted by P(A), while P(A
∣∣B ) denotes the
conditional probability of A given B. We use 1A to denote
the indicator function of A. The set of all probability mass
functions (PMFs) on a finite set X is denoted by P(X ), i.e.,
P(X ) =
{
p : X → [0, 1]
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
x∈X
p(x) = 1]
}
. (3)
PMFs are denoted by the lowercase letters, such as p or q,
with a subscript that identifies the random variable and its
possible conditioning. For example, for a discrete probability
space
(
X ,F ,P
)
and two random variables X and Y over that
space, we use pX , pX,Y and pX|Y to denote, respectively, the
marginal PMF of X , the joint PMF of (X,Y ) and the condi-
tional PMF of X given Y . In particular, pX|Y represents a row
stochastic matrix whose elements are given by pX|Y (x|y) =
4P
(
X−1(x)|Y −1(y)
)
. Expressions such as pX,Y = pXpY |X
are to be understood as pX,Y (x, y) = pX(x)pY |X(y|x), for
all (x, y) ∈ X ×Y . Accordingly, when three random variables
X , Y and Z satisfy pX|Y,Z = pX|Y , they form a Markov
chain, which we denote by X −Y −Z . We omit subscripts if
the arguments of a PMF are lowercase versions of the random
variables.
For a discrete measurable space (X ,F), a PMF q ∈ P(X )
gives rise to a probability measure on (X ,F), which we denote
by Pq; accordingly, Pq
(
A) =
∑
x∈A q(x) for every A ∈ F .
We use Eq to denote an expectation taken with respect to Pq.
Similarly, we use Hq and Iq to indicate that an entropy or
a mutual information is calculated with respect to the PMF
q. For a sequence of random variable Xn, if the entries of
Xn are drawn in an i.i.d. manner according to pX , then for
every x ∈ Xn we have pXn(x) =
∏n
i=1 pX(xi) and we write
pXn(x) = p
n
X(x). Similarly, if for every (x,y) ∈ X
n × Yn
we have pY n|Xn(y|x) =
∏n
i=1 pY |X(yi|xi), then we write
pY n|Xn(y|x) = p
n
Y |X(y|x). The conditional product PMF
pn
Y |X given a specific sequence x ∈ X
n is denoted by pn
Y |X=x.
The empirical PMF νx of a sequence x ∈ X
n is
νx(x) ,
N(x|x)
n
, (4)
where N(x|x) =
∑n
i=1 1{xi=x}. We use T
n
ǫ (p) to denote the
set of letter-typical sequences of length n with respect to the
PMF p ∈ P(X ) and the non-negative number ǫ [31, Chapter
3], i.e., we have
T nǫ (p) =
{
x ∈ Xn
∣∣∣ ∣∣νx(x)− p(x)∣∣ ≤ ǫp(x), ∀x ∈ X}. (5)
For a countable sample space Ω and p, q ∈ P(Ω), the KL
divergence between p and q is
D(p‖q) =
∑
x∈supp(p)
p(x) log
(
p(x)
q(x)
)
(6)
and the total variation between them is
‖p− q‖TV =
1
2
∑
x∈Ω
∣∣p(x)− q(x)∣∣ = ∑
x∈Ω:
p(x)>q(x)
[
p(x)− q(x)
]
.
(7)
Total variation is a distance between probability measures
that satisfies the following properties (see, e.g., [32, Prop-
erty 1]).
Lemma 1 (Properties of Total Variation) Let Ω be a
countable sample space and p, q, r ∈ P(Ω). We have:
1) Triangle inequality: ‖p−r‖TV ≤ ‖p−q‖TV+‖q−r‖TV.
2) Difference of Expectations: If f : Ω → R is a bounded
function with supx |f(x)| ≤ b, then
∣∣Epf − Eqf ∣∣ ≤
2b‖p− q‖TV.
3) Joint / Marginal / Conditional Distributions: If Ω =
X × Y , p = pXpY |X and q = qXqY |X , where
pX , qX ∈ P(X ) and pY |X , qY |X : X → P(Y), then
a) ‖pX − qX‖TV ≤ ‖p− q‖TV;
b) ‖pXpY |X − qXpY |X‖TV = ‖pX − qX‖TV.
KL divergence dominates total variation through Pinsker’s
inequality [33, Theorem 4.1], implying that for any p, q ∈
P(Ω)
‖p− q‖TV ≤
√
1
2
D(p‖q). (8)
The last preliminary result we need states that over finite
probability spaces an exponentially decaying total variation
dominates the difference between two corresponding mutual
information terms. This assertion is formulated in the follow-
ing lemma. The lemma is stated in a manner that best suits
our needs; however, alternative statements [34, Lemma 1] and
even better estimates are available in the literature, e.g., in [35,
Theorem 2]. The proof is omitted.
Lemma 2 (Total Variation and Mutual Information) Let
X and Y be finite sets (with the obvious σ-algebras) and
let {µn}n∈N and {νn}n∈N be two sequences of probability
distributions over Xn × Yn, and denote their marginals on
Xn and Yn by µXn , νXn and µYn , νYn , respectively. Let
{ǫn}n∈N be a sequence of real numbers with limn→∞ ǫn = 0,
such that ∥∥µn − νn∥∥ ≤ ǫn. (9a)
Then, there exists an n0 ∈ N, such that for any n > n0∣∣Iµn(X;Y)− Iνn(X;Y)∣∣ ≤ 2nǫn log |X‖Y| − 3ǫn log ǫn,
(9b)
where Iµn(X;Y) = D
(
µn
∥∥µXnµYn) and Iνn(X;Y) =
D
(
νn
∥∥νXnνYn).
Consequently, if there exists β1 > 0 and an n1 ∈ N such
that for any n > n1 we have
∥∥µn − νn∥∥ ≤ e−nβ1 , then there
exists β2 > 0 and an n2 ∈ N, such that for any n > n2,∣∣Iµn(X;Y) − Iνn(X;Y)∣∣ ≤ e−nβ2 .
III. PROBLEM SETUP
This section sets up the two problems considered in this
work, namely, that of the WTBC and the GPBC.
A. Wiretap Broadcast Channels
Let X , Y1, Y2 and Z be finite sets and let pY1,Y2,Z|X :
X → P(Y1 ×Y2 ×Z) be a transition probability distribution
from X to Y1×Y2×Z . The
(
X ,Y1,Y2,Z, pY1,Y2,Z|X
)
DM-
WTBC is illustrated in Fig. 2(a). The sender chooses a pair
of messages (m1,m2) uniformly at random from product set[
1 : 2nR1
]
×
[
1 : 2nR2
]
and maps it onto a sequence x ∈ Xn
(the mapping may be random). The sequence x is transmitted
over the DM-WTBC with transition probability pY1,Y2,Z|X .
The output sequences y1 ∈ Y
n
1 , y2 ∈ Y
n
2 and z ∈ Z
n are
observed by Receiver 1, Receiver 2 and the eavesdropper,
respectively. Based on yj , j = 1, 2, Receiver j produces an
estimate mˆj of mj . The eavesdropper tries to glean whatever
it can about the transmitted messages (m1,m2) from z.
Definition 1 (Classes of WTBCs) Consider a WTBC(
X ,Y1,Y2,Z, pY1,Y2,Z|X
)
:
• The channel is called SD if its channel transition distribu-
tion factors as pY1,Y2,Z|X = 1{Y1=y1(X)}pY2,Z|X , where
y1 : X → Y1 and pY2,Z|X : X → P(Y2 × Z).
5• The channel is called PD if its channel transition dis-
tribution factors as pY1,Y2,Z|X = pY1,Z|XpY2|Y1 , where
pY1,Z|X : X → P(Y1 ×Z) and pY2|Y1 : Y1 → P(Y2).
• The channel is said to have an informed receiver if the
eavesdropper’s output sequence is available to Receiver
1. Formally, replacing the output random variable Y1 with
Y˜1 = (Y1, Z) reduces the WTBC to have an informed
receiver. With a slight abuse of notation, we refer to this
setup as the
(
X ,Y1,Y2,Z, pY1,Y2,Z|X
)
PD-WTBC with
an informed receiver.
We proceed with some definitions for general WTBCs and
will specialize to the particular instances described above when
needed.
Definition 2 (WTBC Code) An (n,R1, R2)-code cn for the
WTBC with a product message set M
(n)
1 ×M
(n)
2 , where for
j = 1, 2 we set M
(n)
1 , [1 : 2
nRj ], is a triple of functions(
fn, φ
(n)
1 , φ
(n)
2
)
such that
1) fn :M
(n)
1 ×M
(n)
2 → P(X
n) is a stochastic encoder;
2) φ
(n)
j : Y
n
j →M
(n)
j is the decoding function for Receiver
j, for j = 1, 2.
For any (n,R1, R2)-code cn =
(
fn, φ
(n)
1 , φ
(n)
2
)
, the in-
duced joint distribution on M
(n)
1 ×M
(n)
2 ×X
n×Yn1 ×Y
n
2 ×
Zn ×M
(n)
1 ×M
(n)
2 is:
P (cn)(m1,m2,x,y1,y2, z, mˆ1, mˆ2)
=
1∣∣M(n)1 ∥∥M(n)2 ∣∣fn(x|m1,m2)pnY1,Y2,Z|X(y1,y2, z|x)
× 1 ⋂
j=1,2
{
mˆj=φ
(n)
j (yj)
}. (10)
Our analogy relies on developing a unified perspective on
wiretap and GPCs. We arrive at the desired unification by
defining wiretap achievability in a manner slightly different
from typical definitions and incorporating a stealth condition
[4], [5]. Common definitions require the existence of a se-
quence of codes that achieves reliability (i.e., a vanishing error
probability) and security (e.g., vanishing information leakage
and stealth measures). These are two separate requirements
that do not project on one another. Namely, a code for the
WTBC can be reliable but not secure, secure but not reliable,
neither or both.
We take a different approach and merge the reliability and
security criteria into a single requirement on the induced
distribution in (10) to approximate a certain target measure
(e.g., in total variation or rgence). Such definitions have been
more frequently used in recent years (see, e.g., [12], [36]) and
seem to originate from [37]. Section III-B expounds upon the
definition of achievability used herein and shows it is closely
related to more standard definitions.
Definition 3 (WTBC Achievability) A rate pair (R1, R2) ∈
R
2
+ is called achievable if there exists a γ > 0, a probability
distribution qZ ∈ P(Z) and a sequence of (n,R1, R2)-codes
{cn}n∈N such that for any sufficiently large n∥∥∥∥P (cn)M1,M2,Mˆ1,Mˆ2,Z − p(U)M(n)1 ×M(n)2 1{(Mˆ1,Mˆ2)=(M1,M2)}qnZ
∥∥∥∥
TV
≤ e−nγ ,
(11)
where P
(cn)
M1,M2,Mˆ1,Mˆ2,Z
is a marginal of the induced joint
distribution in (10) and p
(U)
A denotes the uniform distribution
over A.
Remark 1 (Rate of Convergence) The exponential rate of
convergence in (11) is not necessary. Any super-linear con-
vergence rate is sufficient for the claims in this work to go
through. The core property we rely on is that sufficiently
fast convergence of total variation dominates the difference
between associated mutual information terms (Lemma 2).
Indeed, Eqn. (9b) shows that so long as ǫn = o(n), the right-
hand side (RHS) decays to 0 with n (note that the cardinalities
of the alphabets X and Y grow at most exponentially fast in
this work). Thus, to adjust our arguments to the super-linear
rate scenario one may replace exponentially decaying terms,
such as e−δn from (28), with corresponding super-linearly
decaying terms. Upon normalizing by n and taking the limit
as n→∞, this has no effect on the final result.
Definition 4 (WTBC Secrecy-Capacity Region) The
secrecy-capacity region CWT(pY1,Y2,Z|X) ⊆ R
2
+ of a DM-
WTBC with transition probability pY1,Y2,Z|X is the convex
closure of the set of all achievable rate pairs.
Remark 2 (Secrecy and Stealth Conditions) As seen from
our definition of achievability (Definition 3), the considered
notion of security requires not only the asymptotic indepen-
dence of (M1,M2) and Z, but also that the distribution of Z
is asymptotically indistinguishable from some product measure
qnZ . The latter is known in the information-theoretic literature
as a stealth condition [4], [5], on which we elaborate in the
next subsection. We therefore stress the secrecy-capacity region
CWT(pY1,Y2,Z|X) is with respect to both secrecy and stealth
and as such, it is generally not larger than the corresponding
region when the stealth requirement is removed. All of our
subsequently presented results account only for when a stealth
condition (on top of standard secrecy) is present.
B. Discussing the Definition of Achievability
We discuss the definition of achievability used in this
work (Definition 3), interpret Equation (11) and compare our
definition to more frequently used notions of achievability.
Equation (11) means that a good sequence of codes induces
a joint distribution (see (10)) whose
(
M1,M2, Mˆ1, Mˆ2,Z
)
-
marginal is asymptotically indistinguishable from the tar-
get measure p
(U)
M
(n)
1 ×M
(n)
2
1{
(Mˆ1,Mˆ2)=(M1,M2)
}qnZ . To interpret
this requirement, observe that:
1) Under the target measure, (Mˆ1, Mˆ2) = (M1,M2) al-
most surely. This corresponds to reliable decoding by
both receivers.
62) Under the target measure, the conditional distribution
of Z given (M1,M2, Mˆ1, Mˆ2) is the product mea-
sure qnZ . Thus, as n grows, the induced distribution
of (M1,M2,Z) approaches p
(U)
M
(n)
1 ×M
(n)
2
× qnZ , which
accounts for both security and stealth [4], [5].2 In-
tuitively, this means that a good sequence of codes
not only secures the transmission, but also makes it
impossible for the eavesdropper to determine whether
communication at all occurred (or was the channel fed
with random noise i.i.d. according to some qX ∈ P(X )
with
∑
x,y1,y2
qX(x)pY1,Y2,Z|X(y1, y2, z|x) = qZ(z),
for all z ∈ Z).
While similar definitions of achievability were used in [12],
[36], [37], a more standard definition was employed in [4], [5].
In that work, reliability was defined through a vanishing proba-
bility of error requirement, while security was measured by the
effective secrecy metric. Adapting the definitions from [4], [5]
to the WTBC considered here gives rise to the following notion
of achievability (to differentiate from Definition 3, we refer
to this as EF-achievability, where ‘EF’ stands for ‘effective
secrecy’).
Definition 5 (EF-Achievability) A rate pair (R1, R2) ∈ R
2
+
is called EF-achievable if there exists a probability distribution
qZ ∈ P(Z) and a sequence of (n,R1, R2)-codes {cn}n∈N
such that
PP (cn)
((
Mˆ1, Mˆ2
)
6= (M1,M2)
)
−−−−→
n→∞
0 (12a)
D
(
P
(cn)
M1,M2,Z
∥∥∥p(U)
M
(n)
1 ×M
(n)
2
qnZ
)
−−−−→
n→∞
0. (12b)
Convergence to zero of the effective secrecy metric in
(12b) guarantees both strong secrecy and stealth. Strong
secrecy refers to a vanishing mutual information between the
confidential message and the eavesdropper’s observation, i.e.,
IP (cn)(M1,M2;Z) → 0 as n → ∞. Stealth is quantified by
means of KL divergence D
(
P
(cn)
Z
∥∥∥qnZ) between the induced
distribution P
(cn)
Z and the product measure q
n
Z . Noting that the
KL divergence in (12b) factors as
D
(
P
(cn)
M1,M2,Z
∥∥∥p(U)
M
(n)
1 ×M
(n)
2
qnZ
)
= IP (cn)(M1,M2;Z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Strong secrecy measure
+ D
(
P
(cn)
Z
∥∥qnZ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Stealth measure
(13)
we see that (12b) indeed implies strong secrecy and stealth.
There is a close relation between the two notions of achiev-
ability from Definitions 3 and 5. This is formalized in the
following proposition.
2Formally, stealth refers to a vanishing divergence between the induced
P
(cn)
Z
and some target product qn
Z
. Different divergences may be considered,
such as the KL divergence D
(
P
(cn)
Z
∥
∥qn
Z
)
−−−−→
n→∞
0 or total variation
∥
∥P (cn)
Z
− qn
Z
∥
∥
TV
−−−−→
n→∞
0.
Proposition 1 (Relation between Definitions 3 and 5) Let
{cn}n∈N be a sequence of (n,R1, R2)-codes for the DM-
WTBC
(
X ,Y1,Y2,Z, pY1,Y2,Z|X
)
. The following implications
hold:
1) If there exist γ1 > 0 and qZ ∈ P(Z) such that for any
n sufficiently large∥∥∥∥P (cn)M1,M2,Mˆ1,Mˆ2,Z−p(U)M(n)1 ×M(n)2 1{(Mˆ1,Mˆ2)=(M1,M2)}qnZ
∥∥∥∥
TV
≤ e−nγ1 ,
(14)
then {cn}n∈N satisfies (12).
2) If there exist γ2 > 0 and qZ ∈ P(Z) such that for any
n sufficiently large
PP (cn)
((
Mˆ1, Mˆ2
)
6= (M1,M2)
)
≤ e−nγ2 (15a)
D
(
P
(cn)
M1,M2,Z
∥∥∥p(U)
M
(n)
1 ×M
(n)
2
qnZ
)
≤ e−nγ2 , (15b)
then {cn}n∈N satisfies (14) for some γ1 > 0 and the
same qZ .
The proof of Proposition 1 is standard and therefore omitted.
It relies on Pinsker’s inequality and [38, Lemma 2.7]. The
proposition says that an achievable rate pair (R1, R2) (with
respect to Definition 3) is always EF-achievable (with respect
to Definition 5). Conversely, given an EF-achievable rate pair
(R1, R2) with a sequence of codes that produces an exponen-
tial decay both in (12a) and (12b), we have that (R1, R2) is
also achievable. The two definitions are therefore equivalent,
provided that the aforementioned quantities converge to 0
exponentially fast with n.
Remark 3 (Natural Sufficient Conditions) We note that the
exponential convergence in (14) and (15) is a rather standard
feature. The direct proofs of our main secrecy-capacity theo-
rems establish the exponential decay of the total variation in
(14) (see Section VI). From a broader view, i.i.d. random cod-
ing ensembles produce an exponential decay of the expected
error probability and the effective secrecy metric (see, e.g.,
[4], [39], [40]). This means that the specific code extracted
from the ensemble would also exhibit exponential convergence
rates of these two quantities. To see this, let
{
Cn
}
n∈N
be a
random coding ensemble, and Pe(cn) and D(cn) be the error
probability and the effective secrecy metric, respectively (the
exact communication scenario is of no consequence here).
Assume that there exists δ > 0 such that for sufficiently large
n we have max
{
EPe(Cn),ED(Cn)
}
≤ e−nδ. For every such
n, the union bound and Markov’s inequality give
P
({
Pe(Cn) > e
−n δ2
}
∪
{
D(Cn) > e
−n δ2
})
≤ en
δ
2EPe(Cn) + e
n δ2ED(Cn)
≤ 2e−n
δ
2 . (16)
Thus, for each large enough n there exists a block-code c′n
with an exponentially decaying Pe(c
′
n) and D(c
′
n).
7C. Gelfand-Pinsker Broadcast Channels
We derive single-letter characterizations of the secrecy-
capacity region of some WTBCs based on the results for
analogous GPBCs. The capacity regions of the SD-GPBC and
the PD-GPBC with an informed receiver were found in [7,
Theorem 1] and [8, Theorem 3], respectively. These results
play a key role in the converse proofs of Theorems 1 and 2.
We next formally define the GPBC setup.
Let Z, X , Y1 and Y2 be finite sets, qZ ∈
P(Z) and qY1,Y2|X,Z : X × Z → P(Y1 × Y2).
The
(
Z,X ,Y1,Y2, qZ , qY1,Y2|X,Z
)
DM-GPBC is shown in
Fig. 2(b). Some particular classes of interest are as follows.
Definition 6 (Classes of GPBCs) Consider a GPBC(
Z,X ,Y1,Y2, qZ , qY1,Y2|X,Z
)
:
• The channel is called SD if its channel transition dis-
tribution factors as qY1,Y2|X,Z = 1{Y1=y1(X,Z)}qY2|X,Z ,
where y1 : X ×Z → Y1 and qY2|X,Z : X ×Z → P(Y2).
• The channel is called PD if its channel transition dis-
tribution factors as qY1,Y2|X,Z = qY1|X,ZqY2|Y1 , where
qY1|X,Z : X × Z → P(Y1) and qY2|Y1 : Y1 → P(Y2).
• The channel is said to have an informed receiver if the
state sequence is available to Receiver 1.
As in Section III-A, we define codes, achievability and
capacity for arbitrary (not necessarily SD) DM-GPBCs, and
will specialize to the above instances when necessary.
Definition 7 (GPBC Code) An (n,R1, R2)-code bn for the
GPBC with a product message set M
(n)
1 × M
(n)
2 , where
M
(n)
j , [1 : 2
nRj ] for j = 1, 2, is a triple of functions(
gn, ψ
(n)
1 , ψ
(n)
2
)
such that
1) gn : Z
n × M
(n)
1 × M
(n)
2 → P(X
n) is a stochastic
encoder;
2) ψ
(n)
j : Y
n
j → M
(n)
j is the decoding function for
Receiver j, for j = 1, 2.
An (n,R1, R2)-code bn =
(
gn, ψ
(n)
1 , ψ
(n)
2
)
induces a joint
distribution over Zn ×M
(n)
1 ×M
(n)
2 × X
n × Yn1 × Y
n
2 ×
M
(n)
1 ×M
(n)
2 that is given by
Q(bn)(z,m1,m2,x,y1,y2, mˆ1, mˆ2)
= qnZ(z)
1∣∣M(n)1 ∥∥M(n)2 ∣∣gn(x|z,m1,m2)
× qnY1,Y2|X,Z(y1,y2|x, z)1 ⋂
j=1,2
{
mˆj=ψ
(n)
j (yj)
}. (17)
To enable the use of previous capacity region character-
izations, we adhere to the (standard) definition of achiev-
ability from [7]–[9]. Thus, the error probability associated
with an (n,R1, R2)-code bn is the probability of the event{(
Mˆ1, Mˆ2
)
6= (M1,M2)
}
under the measure induced by
the PMF Q(bn) in (17). Namely, denoting the probability of
error by Pe(bn), we have Pe(bn) , PQ(bn)
((
Mˆ1, Mˆ2
)
6=
(M1,M2)
)
.
Definition 8 (GPBC Achievability) A rate pair (R1, R2) ∈
R
2
+ is called achievable if there exists a sequence of
(n,R1, R2)-codes {bn}n∈N such that Pe(bn) −−−−→
n→∞
0.
Definition 9 (GPBC Capacity Region) The capacity region
CGP(qZ , qY1,Y2|X,Z) ⊆ R
2
+ of a DM-GPBC with state distri-
bution qZ and transition probability qY1,Y2|X,Z is the convex
closure of the set of all achievable rate pairs.
IV. WIRETAP AND GELFAND-PINSKER ANALOGY
The main idea behind the WTC-GPC analogy is rephrasing
the two problems to get a unified perspective on them both.
Defining achievability in terms of the induced joint distribution
converging to an appropriate target measure under which the
performance criteria (e.g., reliability, security and stealth) are
satisfied does just that. Consequently, one can show that a
sequence of stealth-wiretap codes of a give rate attaining
reliability, security and stealth induces a reliable sequence of
codes (of the same rate) for a corresponding GPC. Then, one
may further deduce that any upper bound on the capacity of
this GPC also serves as an upper bound on the achievable
wiretap rate we have started from.
We next describe the analogy principle for the base case
of the classic wiretap and GPCs. As a first simple exam-
ple, the analogy is used to derive a converse proof for the
WTC’s secrecy-capacity theorem (when a stealth requirement
is present; see, e.g., [4, Theorem 1]). Then, we outline
extensions of this idea to multiuser (namely, broadcasting)
scenarios. These extension are used to prove the main secrecy-
capacity results of this work that are stated in Section V.
A. Base Case - WTC and GPC Analogy
1) A Unified Perspective: The WTC and the GPC are re-
lated through the fact that their target joint distributions share
the same structure. To see this, consider the classic WTC with
transition probability pY,Z|X : X → P(Y × Z), for which
achievability is defined similarly to Definition 3, and the point-
to-point GPC with state distribution qZ ∈ P(Z) and channel
transition probability qY |X,Z : X × Z → P(Y).
3 The joint
distribution induced by an (n,R)-code cn = (fn, φn) for the
wiretap channel is (see (10))
P˜ (cn)(m,x,y, z, mˆ)
=
1
|Mn|
fn(x|m)p
n
Y,Z|X(y, z|x)1
{
mˆ=φn(y)
}, (18)
while the induced joint distribution for the GPC with respect
to an (n,R)-code bn = (gn, ψn) is (see (17))
Q˜(bn)(z,m,x,y, mˆ)
= qnZ(z)
1
|Mn|
gn(x|z,m)q
n
Y |X,Z(y|x, z)1
{
mˆ=ψn(y)
}. (19)
3These two problems are special cases of their broadcast versions defined in
Sections III-A and III-C, respectively. Setting R2 = 0, Y2 = 0 and relabeling
M
(n)
1 , R1 and Y1 asMn, R and Y , respectively, reduces the definitions of
the broadcast versions to the point-to-point scenario.
8With respect to Definition 3, a rate R is achievable for the
WTC if there exist a sequence of (n,R)-codes {cn}n∈N and
a distribution qZ ∈ P(Z), such that∥∥∥P˜ (cn)
M,Mˆ,Z
− p
(U)
Mn
1{Mˆ=M}q
n
Z
∥∥∥
TV
−−−−→
n→∞
0, (20)
exponentially fast with n, where P˜
(cn)
M,Mˆ,Z
is the (M, Mˆ,Z)-
marginal of P˜ (cn) in (18).
For the GPC, achievability is defined by adapting Def-
inition 8 to the point-to-point case. Namely, R ∈ R+ is
achievable if there exists a sequence of (n,R)-codes {bn}n∈N
for the GPC such that
Pe(bn) , PQ˜(bn)
(
Mˆ 6= M
)
−−−−→
n→∞
0. (21)
Now, observe that
PQ˜(bn)
(
Mˆ 6= M
)
=
∑
m,mˆ∈Mn:
m 6=mˆ
Q˜(bn)(m, mˆ)
=
∑
m,mˆ∈Mn:
m 6=mˆ
[
Q˜(bn)(m, mˆ)− p
(U)
Mn
(m)1{mˆ=m}
]
(a)
=
∑
m,mˆ∈Mn:
Q˜(bn)(m,mˆ)>p
(U)
Mn
(m)1{mˆ=m}
[
Q˜(bn)(m, mˆ)− p
(U)
Mn
(m)1{mˆ=m}
]
(b)
=
∥∥∥Q˜(bn)
M,Mˆ
− p
(U)
Mn
1{Mˆ=M}
∥∥∥
TV
(22)
where (a) is since m 6= mˆ if and only if Q˜(bn)(m, mˆ) ≥
p
(U)
Mn
(m)1{mˆ=m} and because (m, mˆ) pairs for which we
have an equality do not contribute to the summation; (b) is
by the second equality in (7). If the error probability decays
exponentially fast, then by Pinsker’s inequality we have4∥∥∥Q˜(cn)
M,Mˆ,Z
− p
(U)
Mn
1{Mˆ=M}q
n
Z
∥∥∥
TV
−−−−→
n→∞
0, (23)
with an exponential convergence rate.
Having (20) and (23), it is evident that although each prob-
lem has its own induced joint distribution, their target measures
share the same structure. In both problems, a “good” sequence
of codes induces a sequence of distributions (
{
P˜ (cn)
}
n∈N
or
{
Q˜(bn)
}
n∈N
for the WTC or the GPC, respectively) that
approximates a target distribution where: (i) M = Mˆ almost
surely; (ii) Z is independent of M ; and (iii) the entries of
Z are i.i.d. The first item is a consequence of the reliability
requirement in both problems. For the second and third items,
note that Z having i.i.d. entries that are independent of M
is the security and stealth requirements in the WTC scenario.
For the GPC, however, these statistical relations are a part of
the problem definition.
2) Constructing Analogous Models and Codes: Equipped
with the above perspective, we next show that good stealth-
wiretap codes induce good codes for a corresponding GPC. To
4The converse claim is also true: convergence to zero of the total variation
in (23) implies Pe(bn) −−−−→
n→∞
0. This is an immediate consequence of (22)
and Property (3-a) from Lemma 1.
formalize this statement, we first describe how an analogous
GPC is constructed from a given WTC and a good sequence of
codes for it. Let
(
X ,Y,Z, pY,Z|X
)
be a WTC with a target
(product) distribution qnZ for the eavesdropper’s observation.
The analogous GPC is obtained by:
1) Replacing the eavesdropper of the WTC with a state
sequence Z distributed according to qnZ ;
2) Revealing Z in a non-causal manner to the encoder;
3) Setting the state-dependent channel to pY |X,Z (the con-
ditional marginal of the WTC’s transition probability)
with Z in the role of the state.
These steps convert the WTC and the given sequence of codes
into a
(
Z,X ,Y, qZ , pY |X,Z
)
GPC. If the WTC’s receiver
observes both Y and Z, then the receiver of the analogous
GPC has access to the state sequence Z (see Fig. 3 for an
illustration). Notably, the capacity formulas of two analogous
models are given as an optimization (over different domains)
of the same information measures.
Proposition 2 (From Stealth-Wiretap Codes to GP Codes)
Let X , Y and Z be finite sets and consider a(
X ,Y,Z, pY,Z|X
)
WTC. Let R ∈ R+ be an achievable
rate for the WTC, with a corresponding sequence of (n,R)-
codes {cn}n∈N, where cn = (fn, φn) for each n ∈ N,
attaining target stealth measure qZ ∈ P(Z), and exponent
γ > 0 (see Definition 3).
For every n ∈ N, define gn , P˜
(cn)
X|Z,M and ψn , φn, where
P˜
(cn)
X|Z,M is the conditional marginal distribution of X given
(Z,M) with respect to P˜ (cn) in (18) induced by the n-th
wiretap code cn. Then:
1) bn , (gn, ψn) is an (n,R)-code for the(
Z,X ,Y, qZ , pY |X,Z
)
GPC.
2) Letting Q˜(bn) , Q˜
(bn)
Z,M,X,Y,Mˆ
denote the joint distri-
butions induced by bn, for n sufficiently large we have∥∥∥P˜ (cn) − Q˜(bn)∥∥∥
TV
≤ e−nγ .
3) The sequence of codes {bn}n∈N attains Pe(bn) −−−−→
n→∞
0,
and consequently, R is achievable for the aforemen-
tioned GPC.
This proposition, whose proof is relegated to Section VI-A,
enables the use of the GPC setup and known upper bounds
on its capacity to furnish converse proofs for corresponding
WTC scenarios. As a simple demonstration, we next give an
alternative proof for the converse of the WTC secrecy-capacity
theorem (when a stealth condition is present).
3) New Converse Proof for the Classic WTC: Consider
the
(
X ,Y,Z, pY,Z|X
)
WTC, for which codes, achievability
and secrecy-capacity are defined in accordance with the
previous section. The secrecy-capacity CWT(pY,Z|X) is given
by
CWT(pY,Z|X) = max
pU,X∈P(U×X )
[
Ip(U ;Y )− Ip(U ;Z)
]
, (24)
where the mutual information terms are taken with respect to
the joint distribution p , pU,XpY,Z|X . This classic formula
was first derived by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner under the weak-
secrecy measure [2], and was shown to also hold under
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n
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Z ∼ P
(cn)
Z|M ≈ q
n
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Z ∼ P
(cn)
Z|M ≈ q
n
Z qnZ
Z
CWT = max
pU,X
[
I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z)
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CGP = max
qU,X|Z
[
I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z)
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= max
qX|Z
I(X ;Y |Z)
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PSfrag replacements
M M
fn gn
X Xpn
Y,Z|X
pnY |X,Z
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φn ψn
Mˆ Mˆ
Z ∼ P
(cn)
Z|M ≈ q
n
Z
Z ∼ P
(cn)
Z|M ≈ q
n
Z
qnZ
Z
CWT = max
pU,X
[
I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z)
]
CGP = max
qU,X|Z
[
I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z)
]
C
(IR)
WT
= max
pX
I(X ;Y |Z) C
(IR)
GP
= max
qX|Z
I(X ;Y |Z)
(b)
Fig. 3: WTC and GPC analogy: (a) The GPC is obtained from the WTC by replacing the eavesdropper (whose distribution
of the channel observation given the message P
(cn)
Z|M asymptotically approaches the product measure q
n
Z) with a state sequence
Z ∼ qnZ , revealing Z to the encoder and setting the state-dependent channel pY |X,Z as the conditional marginal distribution of
the WTC’s transition probability pY,Z|X ; (b) If the WTC receiver also observes Z, then the receiver of the analogous GPC is
informed of the state.
more stringent security notions such as strong-secrecy [41],
effective secrecy [4] and even semantic-security [40], [42].
This formula also characterizes the secrecy-capacity under our
definition of achievability (see (20)). The direct part is a simple
consequence of the achievability proof of Theorem 1 from [4]
and Proposition 1 herein. In the following we show how to
prove
CWT(pY,Z|X) ≤ max
pU,X∈P(U×X )
[
Ip(U ;Y )− Ip(U ;Z)
]
, (25)
based on having a converse proof for the GPC. Let R
be an achievable rate for the
(
X ,Y,Z, pY,Z|X
)
WTC and
let {cn}n∈N be the corresponding sequence of (n,R)-codes
satisfying (20) for some γ > 0 and qZ ∈ P(Z), and any
sufficiently large n. By Proposition 2, we get a sequence
of (n,R)-codes {bn}n∈N for the GPC
(
Z,X ,Y, qZ , pY |X,Z
)
satisfying Items (2) and (3) from the proposition.
The converse proof for the GP coding theorem, in particular,
shows that if {bn}n∈N is a sequence of (n,R)-codes with a
vanishing error probability, then
R ≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
IQ˜(bn)
(
M,Y[1:i−1], Z[i+1:n];Yi
)
− IQ˜(bn)
(
M,Y[1:i−1], Z[i+1:n];Zi
)]
+ ǫn, (26)
where ǫn ,
1
n
+ R · Pe(bn) −−−−→
n→∞
0. Let n be sufficiently
large so that (20) holds. Since∥∥∥P˜ (cn)M,Y[1:i],Z[i:n] − Q˜(bn)M,Y[1:i],Z[i:n]∥∥∥
TV
≤
∥∥∥P˜ (cn) − Q˜(bn)∥∥∥
TV
≤ e−nγ , ∀i ∈ [1 : n],
(27)
and because exponential convergence of total variation (over
finite probability spaces) dominates the corresponding differ-
ence of mutual information terms (see Lemma 2), there exists
a δ > 0, such that
IQ˜(bn)
(
M,Y[1:i−1], Z[i+1:n];Yi
)
− IQ˜(bn)
(
M,Y[1:i−1], Z[i+1:n];Zi
)
≤ IP˜ (cn)
(
M,Y[1:i−1], Z[i+1:n];Yi
)
− IP˜ (cn)
(
M,Y[1:i−1], Z[i+1:n];Zi
)
+ 2e−nδ. (28)
Denoting ηn , 2e
−nδ + ǫn, and inserting (28) into (26),
further gives
R ≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
IP˜ (cn)
(
M,Y[1:i−1], Z[i+1:n];Yi
)
− IP˜ (cn)
(
M,Y[1:i−1], Z[i+1:n];Zi
)]
+ ηn
(a)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
IP˜ (cn)
(
Ui;Yi
)
− IP˜ (cn)
(
Ui;Zi
)]
+ ηn, (29)
where (a) is by defining Ui ,
(
M,Y[1:i−1], Z[i+1:n]
)
, for
10
i ∈ [1 : n]. By letting T ∼ Unif[1 : n] be independent
of (M,Xn, Y n, Zn) and defining U , (UT , T ), X , XT ,
Y , YT and Z , ZT , we obtain
R ≤ Ip˜(U ;Y )− Ip˜(U ;Z) + ηn, (30)
where p˜ denotes the joint distribution of the random variables
(U,X, Y, Z) defined above. It is readily verified that under p˜,
(Y, Z) − X − U forms a Markov chain. The converse proof
is concluded by further maximizing the RHS of (30) over all
pU,X ∈ P(U × X ) and taking the limit of n→∞.
Remark 4 (Alternative Analogy-Based Derivation) An al-
ternative way to prove (25) based on the analogy between
the WTC and the GPC is the following. One could proceed
from (26) to further upper bound R as
R
(a)
≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
IQ˜(bn)
(
Ui;Yi
)
− IQ˜(bn)
(
Ui;Zi
)]
+ ǫn
(b)
= Iq˜(U ;Y )− Iq˜(U ;Z) + ǫn, (31)
where (a) is by defining Ui ,
(
M,Y[1:i−1], Z[i+1:n]
)
for
i ∈ [1 : n], while (b) follows by time-sharing arguments and
setting q˜ as the joint distribution of the random variables
U , (UT , T ), X , XT , Y , YT and Z , ZT ; here
T ∼ Unif[1 : n] is the same time-sharing random variable
used for the derivation of (30). Noting that q˜ can be computed
from p
(U)
[1:n] × Q˜
(bn) and since the latter is well-approximated
by p
(U)
[1:n]× P˜
(cn), one can upper bound the RHS of (31) with
Ip˜(U ;Y ) − Ip˜(U ;Z) plus a vanishing term. Here p˜ is the
distribution defined after (30).
Remark 5 (The Obtained Bound on Secrecy-Capacity)
We point out the following detail concerning our analogy-
based proof. Provided an upper bound U on the capacity of a
GPC CGP(qZ , qY |X,Z) our method shows that the analogous
WTC has CWT(pY,Z|X) ≤ U
′, for some U′ ≤ U. Clearly,
U also bounds the WTC capacity, but U′ could potentially
be strictly smaller (because of the different optimizations
domains).
B. Extension to Multiuser Setups
We extend the above ideas to broadcast channels. By
relating the WTBC and the GPBC through a claim in the spirit
of Proposition 2, the analogy-based method enables a converse
proof for any WTBC whose analogous GPBC has a solution.
This is the main idea behind the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2
(see Sections VI-B and VI-C).
Consider a WTBC
(
X ,Y1,Y2,Z, pY1,Y2,Z|X
)
as defined in
Section III-A and a corresponding sequence of stealth-wiretap
codes attaining a stealth target measure qZ . Similarly to the
base case, an analogous GPBC is constructed in three steps:
1) Replace the eavesdropper of the WTBC with a state
sequence Z ∼ qnZ ;
2) Non-causally reveal Z to the encoder;
3) Set the GPBC’s transition probability as the conditional
marginal distribution pY1,Y2|X,Z .
The produced analogous
(
Z,X ,Y1,Y2, qZ , pY1,Y2|X,Z
)
GPBC inherits the properties the WTBC possesses
(e.g., deterministic components, order of degradeness,
etc). For example, if the WTBC is SD, i.e.,
pY1,Y2,Z|X = 1{Y1=y1(X)}pY2,Z|X , then so is the GPBC
since pY1,Y2|X,Z = 1{Y1=y1(X)}pY2|X,Z . If one of the
observed signals of the legitimate receivers is a degraded
version of the other, then the same ordering applies for
the signal intercepted by the receivers of the GPBC. The
analogy also accounts for WTBC settings with cooperative
components. Namely, if the receivers of the WTBC are
connected by, e.g., a finite-capacity noiseless communication
link, then the same applies for the receivers of the analogous
GPBC.
As for the base case, the WTBC secrecy-capacity regions
we derive in this work correspond to those of the analo-
gous GPBCs . Namely, the information measures bounding
the transmission rates in each region have the same form.
However, the underlying distributions and the optimization
domains are different. These relations between the admissible
rate regions are emphasized in Section V.
In Fig. 4(a) we illustrate a pair of analogous WTBC and
GPBC setups. The capacity region of the SD-GPBC, i.e.,
when pY1,Y2|X,Z = 1{Y1=y1(X,Z)}pY2|X,Z , was derived in [7].
Fig. 4(b) depicts the analogy when Receiver 1 of the BC is
informed (of the eavesdropper’s observation for the wiretap
setup and of the state sequence for the GP scenario), and a
cooperation link of capacity c12 < ∞ extends from Receiver
1 to Receiver 2. The capacity region of this GPBC setup
without and with the cooperation link was found in [8] and [9],
respectively, under the assumption that Y2−Y1−(X,Z) forms
a Markov chain.
Since GPBCs have been extensively treated in the literature
and capacity results are available for many cases [7]–[9],
[43], the analogy allows leveraging these results to study
corresponding WTBCs. This is done by relating the perfor-
mance of two analogous models through a simple extension
of Proposition 2, which we state next. The proof is omitted as
it closely follows the derivation shown in Appendix VI-A.
Proposition 3 (From WTBC Codes to GPBC Codes)
Let X , Y1, Y2 and Z be finite sets and consider a(
X ,Y1,Y2,Z, pY1,Y2,Z|X
)
WTBC. Let (R1, R2) ∈ R
2
+
be an achievable rate pair for the WTBC, with a
corresponding sequence of (n,R1, R2)-codes {cn}n∈N,
where cn =
(
fn, φ
(n)
1 , φ
(n)
2
)
, for each n ∈ N, attaining
target stealth measure qZ ∈ P(Z), and exponent γ > 0. For
every n ∈ N, define gn , P
(cn)
X|Z,M1,M2
and ψ
(n)
j , φ
(n)
j ,
for j = 1, 2, where P
(cn)
X|Z,M1,M2
is the conditional marginal
distribution of X given (Z,M1,M2) with respect to P
(cn) in
(10) induced by the n-th wiretap code cn. Then:
1) bn , (gn, ψ
(n)
1 , ψ
(n)
2 ) is an (n,R1, R2)-code for the(
Z,X ,Y1,Y2, qZ , pY1,Y2|X,Z
)
GPBC.
2) For any n large enough, the distribution Q(bn) induced
by bn (see (17)) satisfies
∥∥P (cn) −Q(bn)∥∥
TV
≤ e−nγ .
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Fig. 4: WTBC and GPBC analogy: (a) The GPBC is obtained from the WTBC by replacing the eavesdropper (whose observation
distribution given the message P
(cn)
Z|M1,M2
asymptotically approaches qnZ ) with a state sequence Z ∼ q
n
Z , revealing Z to the
encoder and setting the state-dependent BC pY1,Y2|X,Z as the conditional marginal distribution of the WTBC’s transition
probability pY1,Y2,Z|X ; (b) If one of the WTBC’s receivers also observes Z then the same receiver of the analogous GPBC is
informed of the state. Furthermore, cooperative WTBC receivers correspond to cooperative receivers in the analogous GPBC.
3) The sequence of codes {bn}n∈N attains Pe(bn) −−−−→
n→∞
0,
and consequently, (R1, R2) is an achievable rate pair
for the aforementioned GPBC.
V. NEW SECRECY-CAPACITY RESULTS
We give a single-letter characterization of the secrecy-
capacity region of the SD-WTBC and of the PD-WTBC with
an informed receiver (with and without receiver cooperation).
In accordance to our definition of achievability, the derived
regions are valid when a stealth requirement is added to the
regular vanishing information leakage criterion. A discussion
comparing our derivations to previously known results for
these WTBC models is given in Remark 11 at the end of
this section.
1) Semi-Deterministic WTBCs: Consider an(
X ,Y1,Y2,Z,1{Y1=y1(X)}pY2,Z|X
)
SD-WTBC and let
U be a set with cardinality |U| ≤ |X | + 1. For any
pU,X ∈ P(U × X ) define
R
(SD)
WT
(
pU,X ,1{Y1=y1(X)}pY2,Z|X
)
,


(R1, R2) ∈ R
2
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
R1 ≤ Hp(Y1|Z),
R2 ≤ Ip(U ;Y2)− Ip(U ;Z),
R1 +R2 ≤ Hp(Y1|Z) + Ip(U ;Y2)
− Ip(U ;Y1, Z)


,
(32)
where the mutual information terms are calculated with respect
to the joint distribution p , pU,X1{Y1=y1(X)}pY2,Z|X , under
which (Y1, Y2, Z)−X − U forms a Markov chain and Y1 is
a deterministic function of X .
Theorem 1 (SD-WTBC Secrecy-Capacity) The secrecy-
capacity region of the
(
X ,Y1,Y2,Z,1{Y1=y1(X)} ×pY2,Z|X
)
SD-WTBC is given by
C
(SD)
WT
(
1{Y1=y1(X)}pY2,Z|X
)
=
⋃
pU,X∈P(U×X )
R
(SD)
WT
(
pU,X ,1{Y1=y1(X)}pY2,Z|X
)
. (33)
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Section VI-B. The
direct part relies on a specialization of the inner bound on the
secrecy-capacity region of the WTBC derived in [12, Theorem
3]. As the performance criterion in that work corresponds to
the definition of achievability used herein (Definition 3), the
result from [12] applies for our setup.5 The main technical
novelty in this work is the proof of the converse claim. Namely,
we relate the WTBC to the corresponding GPBC that was
5While the definition of WTBC achievability in [12] does not explicitly
require stealth (see Section IV-F therein), their proof attains it nonetheless. To
see this, note that the p(zn) used throughout the proof of Theorem 3 from
[12] is a product distribution (see Protocol A) and that their achievability
proof in particular shows that the distribution induced by the code at the
eavesdropper’s end approximates this p(zn) (as evident from Equation (52)
in [12] and the two unnumbered equations following it).
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studied in [7] and use the converse proof of Theorem 1
therein to establish the RHS of (33) as an outer bound on
C
(SD)
WT
(
1{Y1=y1(X)}pY2,Z|X
)
.
Remark 6 (Analogous SD-GPBC) The analogous GPBC is
defined by the tuple
(
Z,X ,Y1,Y2, qZ ,1{Y1=y1(X)}qY2|X,Z
)
.
It was considered in [7], where its capacity region was found.
The region is described by the same inequalities as in (32), but
with an underlying distribution qZqU,X|Z1{Y1=y1(X)}qY2|X,Z ,
and the union is over all qU,X|Z . Evidently, the structure of
the two regions correspond.
We note that the converse proof of Theorem 1 from [7] is
highly nontrivial and relies on novel optimization tricks for
arriving at an outer bound described by a single auxiliary
variable. Furthermore, the proof makes use of the i.i.d. nature
of the state sequence Z and its independence of the messages
multiple times. Through the analogy, we are able to ‘borrow’
these nice statistical properties of Z and the messages, as well
as the novel optimization tricks to derive the WTBC converse
of Theorem 1 above. We stress that one may not simply repeat
the GPBC converse proof steps when upper bounding the
transmission rates over a WTBC. This is since the underlying
distribution in the WTBC is P (cn) from (10), under which Z
it is generally not i.i.d. nor it is independent of (M1,M2).
Remark 7 (Cardinality Bound) Theorem 1 implicitly states
that to exhaust the secrecy-capacity region one may restrict
the auxiliary random variable U to take values in a set U
whose cardinality is bounded by |U| ≤ |X | + 1. This is
a direct consequence of the Eggleston-Fenchel-Carathe´odory
theorem [44, Theorem 18] via an approach identical to the
applied for the analogous GPBC in [45, Appendix A].
2) Physically Degraded WTBCs with an Informed Receiver:
Consider an
(
X ,Y1,Y2,Z, pY1,Z|XpY2|Y1
)
PD-WTBC with
an informed receiver, i.e., when Receiver 1 observes the pair
(Y1, Z). Let U be a set with cardinality |U| ≤ |X | + 1, and
for any pU,X ∈ P(U × X ) define
R
(PD−IR)
WT
(
pU,X , pY1,Z|XpY2|Y1
)
,

(R1, R2) ∈ R2+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
R1 ≤ Ip(X ;Y1|U,Z),
R2 ≤ Ip(U ;Y2)− Ip(U ;Z)

 , (34)
where the mutual information terms are calculated with respect
to the joint distribution p , pU,XpY1,Z|XpY2|Y1 , under which
Y2 − Y1 − (Z,X,U) and (Y1, Y2, Z) −X − U form Markov
chains.
Theorem 2 (PD-WTBC Secrecy-Capacity) The secrecy-
capacity region of the
(
X ,Y1,Y2,Z, pY1,Z|XpY2|Y1
)
PD-WTBC with an informed receiver is given by
C
(PD−IR)
WT
(
pY1,Z|XpY2|Y1
)
=
⋃
pU,X∈P(U×X )
R
(PD−IR)
WT
(
pU,X , pY1,Z|XpY2|Y1
)
. (35)
Theorem 2 is proven in Section VI-C. The converse is
derived via analogy-based arguments that exploit the capacity
characterization for the corresponding PD-GPBC with an
informed decoder [8, Theorem 3] (see the following remark).
Achievability follows by random coding arguments that use
a stealth-wiretap superposition code construction. The inner
layer encodes the M2 message and is decoded by both
receivers. The message M1 is encoded in the outer layer of
the code and is decoded by the informed receiver only. Both
layers of the code are injected with sufficient randomness to
conceal the confidential messages from the eavesdropper.
Although achievability of C
(PD−IR)
WT
(
pY1,Z|XpY2|Y1
)
can be
derived as a consequence of [12, Theorem 3], we prefer to
prove it directly through the aforementioned superposition
coding scheme. The explicit construction readily extends to
account for cooperative receivers (through a simple binning
argument). This extension enables deriving achievability for
the cooperative version of the considered PD-WTBC, as
explained in the next subsection.
Remark 8 (Analogous PD-GPBC) The analogous(
Z,X ,Y1,Y2, qZ , qY1|X,ZqY2|Y1
)
PD-GPBC with an
informed receiver was studied in [8, Theorem 3]. Specifically,
non-casual CSI was assumed to be available at the encoder
and at Receiver 1. The capacity region is described by
the same expressions as in (34), but with an underlying
distribution q , qZqU,X|ZqY1|X,ZqY2|Y1 with the union taken
over all qU,X|Z distributions.
Remark 9 (Cardinality Bound) The cardinality bound on
U again follows from the Eggleston-Fenchel-Carathe´odory
theorem [44, Theorem 18] through arguments similar to those
presented in Remark 7. The proof is omitted.
3) PD-WTBC with Informed Receiver and Cooperation:
A simple extension of the proof of Theorem 2 produces
a single-letter characterization of the secrecy-capacity of
the considered PD-WTBC with cooperative receivers. More
specifically, consider the PD-WTBC with an informed receiver
and where a unidirectional noiseless link of capacity c12 <∞
extends from (the informed) Receiver 1 to (the uninformed)
Receiver 2.
Corollary 1 (Cooperative PD-WTBC Secrecy-Capacity)
The secrecy-capacity region of this setup is the union of rate
pairs (R1, R2) ∈ R
2
+ satisfying:
R1 ≤ Ip(X ;Y1|U,Z) (36a)
R2 ≤ Ip(U ;Y2)− Ip(U ;Z) + c12 (36b)
R1 +R2 ≤ Ip(X ;Y1|Z) (36c)
where the union is over all pU,X ∈ P(U ×X ), each inducing
a joint distribution p , pU,XpY1,Z|XpY2|Y1 .
A derivation of this result is omitted due to its similarity
to the proof of Theorem 2. Roughly speaking, achievability
follows by the same stealth-wiretap superposition code used
for the non-cooperative case, with one additional ingredient.
To exploit the cooperation link, the legitimate parties agree
on a partitioning of the message set M
(n)
2 into approximately
2nc12 equal sized subsets (bins). Upon decoding the inner layer
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of the code (which carries M2), Receiver 1 shares the bin
index of the decoded M2 with Receiver 2 via the cooperation
link. This reduces the search space of Receiver 2 in decoding
M2 by a factor of 2
−nc12 , and produces (36b). With this
modification, the reliability and security analysis are similar to
those presented in Section VI-C. For the converse, we use the
analogy to the PD-GPBC with cooperative receivers discussed
in the next remark.
Remark 10 (Analogous PD-GPBC) An instance of the con-
sidered PD-GPBC where the receivers can cooperate via a
unidirectional finite-capacity noiseless link that extends from
(the informed) Receiver 1 to (the uninformed) Receiver 2 was
studied in [9]. Theorem 7 from that work characterizes the
admissible rate region by the same expressions as in (36), but
with an underlying distribution q , qZqU,X|ZqY1|X,ZqY2|Y1 .
Remark 11 (Comparison to Past WTBC Results) The
secrecy-capacity regions of the SD- and the PD-WTBCs are
currently known only in some special cases. Notably, [13,
Theorem 5] characterized the SD-WTBC’s weak-secrecy-
capacity region under the assumption that the stochastic
channel to the second receiver is less noisy than the
eavesdropper’s channel. Theorem 7 in that paper established
the optimal region of the (non-cooperative) PD-WTBCs when
both legitimate users are less noisy than the eavesdropper.
Because our notion of security includes also a stealth
condition, the secrecy-capacity regions derived herein are
generally inner bounds on the corresponding regions from
[13]. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that our result for the SD-
WTBC does not rely on the existence of any ordering between
the channels to the different nodes. Similarly, for the PD-
WTBC with an informed receiver our derivation avoids the as-
sumption that the uninformed receiver observes a better signal
than the eavesdropper. Furthermore, our secrecy-capacity de-
scriptions use a single auxiliary random variable, as opposed
to the two auxiliaries used in Theorems 5 and 7 of [13]. The
converse proofs of these two theorems directly upper bound the
transmission rates under the WTBC’s distribution; getting tight
bounds relies on the less-noisy assumptions and the second
auxiliary. By virtue of our analogy, we avoid directly upper
bounding the WTBC’s transmission rates, and instead, exploit
the GPBC’s converse proof from [7, Theorem 1] and [9,
Theorem 3] to establish the converses of our Theorems 1
and 2, respectively. Consequently, our converse proofs use only
a single auxiliary (as in [7, Theorem 1] and [8, Theorem 3])
and do not assume any ordering between the sub-channels
beyond what is required in the analogous GP scenarios.
VI. PROOFS
A. Proposition 2
To prove (1) simply note that for each n ∈ N, P˜
(cn)
X|Z,M :
Zn ×Mn → P(X
n) and φn : Y
n → Mn. Therefore, gn
and ψn are valid (stochastic) encoding and (deterministic)
decoding functions for the GPC.
For (2), fix n ∈ N, and first observe
P˜
(cn)
M,X,Y,Z,Mˆ
= P˜
(cn)
M,Z · P˜
(cn)
X,Y,Mˆ|M,Z
(a)
= P˜
(cn)
M,Z · gn · p
n
Y |X,Z · 1
{
Mˆ=ψn(Y)
}
(b)
= P˜
(cn)
M,Z · Q˜
(bn)
X,Y,Mˆ|M,Z
where (a) follows by the factorization of P˜ (cn) in (18), while
(b) is because bn = (gn, ψn) and due to the structure of Q˜
(bn)
in (19). Recalling that Q˜
(cn)
Z,M = q
n
Z · p
(U)
Mn
, we have∥∥∥P˜ (cn) − Q˜(bn)∥∥∥
TV
=
∥∥∥P˜ (cn)M,Z − p(U)Mn · qnZ∥∥∥
TV
−−−−→
n→∞
0,
(37)
where (a) uses Property (3-b) from Lemma 1 and (b) follows
by the hypothesis of Proposition 2.
The third claim follows by noting that
Pe(bn)
(a)
=
∥∥∥Q˜(bn)
M,Mˆ
− p
(U)
Mn
1{Mˆ=M}
∥∥∥
TV
(b)
≤
∥∥∥Q˜(bn)
M,Mˆ
− P˜
(cn)
M,Mˆ
∥∥∥
TV
+
∥∥∥P˜ (cn)
M,Mˆ
− p
(U)
Mn
1{Mˆ=M}
∥∥∥
TV
(c)
≤
∥∥∥Q˜(bn) − P˜ (cn)∥∥∥
TV
+
∥∥∥P˜ (cn)
M,Mˆ,Z
− p
(U)
Mn
1{Mˆ=M}q
n
Z
∥∥∥
TV
where (a) is by (22), (b) is the triangle inequality, while (c)
uses Property (3-a) from Lemma 1, (37) and the hypothesis
of Proposition 2.
B. Proof of Theorem 1
1) Direct: The achievability of CWT(1{Y1=y1(X)}pY2,Z|X)
is a consequence of Theorem 3 from [12], where an inner
bound on the secrecy-capacity region of any DM-WTBC with
a common message and two private messages was derived. We
restate [12, Theorem 3] in the following without the common
message (R0 = 0).
Consider the
(
X ,Y1,Y2,Z, pY1,Y2,Z|X
)
WTBC. Let Q and
Uj , for j = 0, 1, 2, be finite sets and for any pQ,U[0:2],X ∈
P(Q× U0 × U1 × U2 ×X ) let R
(I)
WT
(
pQ,U[0:2],X , pY1,Y2,Z|X
)
be the set of (R1, R2) ∈ R
2
+ satisfying
R1 ≤ Ip(U0, U1;Y1|Q)− Ip(U0, U1;Z|Q) (38a)
R2 ≤ Ip(U0, U2;Y2|Q)− Ip(U0, U2;Z|Q) (38b)
R1 +R2 ≤ min
{
Ip(U0;Y1|Q), Ip(U0;Y2|Q)
}
+ Ip(U1;Y1|U0, Q) + Ip(U2;Y2|U0, Q)
− Ip(U1;U2|U0, Q)− Ip(U[0:2];Z|Q) (38c)
R1 +R2 ≤ Ip(U0, U1;Y1|Q)− Ip(U0, U1;Z|Q)
+ Ip(U0, U2;Y2|Q)− Ip(U0, U2;Z|Q)
− Ip(U1;U2|U0, Z,Q) (38d)
where the mutual information terms are taken with respect to
the joint distribution p , pQ,U[0:2],XpY1,Y2,Z|X , under which
(Y1, Y2, Z) − X −
(
Q,U[0:2]
)
forms a Markov chain. An
inner bound on the secrecy-capacity region CWT(pY1,Y2,Z|X)
of the WTBC (with respect to the notion of achievability from
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Definition 36) is
CWT(pY1,Y2,Z|X) ⊇
⋃
pQ,U[0:2],X
R
(I)
WT
(
pQ,U[0:2],X , pY1,Y2,Z|X
)
.
(39)
For the considered SD-WTBC pY1,Y2,Z|X =
1{Y1=y1(X)}pY2,Z|X , setting Q = U0 = 0, U1 = Y1 and
recasting U2 as U reduces (38) to (32). Since Y1 = y1(X),
this choice of the auxiliary random variables
(
Q,U[0:2]
)
is
feasible.
2) Converse: The converse proof closely follows the ar-
guments from Section IV-A3 for the classic WTC. Let
(R1, R2) ∈ R
2
+ be an achievable rate pair for the SD-
WTBC and {cn}n∈N be a sequence of (n,R1, R2)-codes
satisfying (11) for some γ > 0 and qZ ∈ P(Z), and
any n large enough. By Proposition 3, {cn}n∈N gives
rise to a sequence of (n,R1, R2)-codes {bn}n∈N for the(
Z,X ,Y1,Y2, qZ , pY1,Y2|X,Z
)
GPBC, each inducing a joint
distribution Q(bn) as given in (17), such that:
1)
∥∥P (cn) −Q(bn)∥∥
TV
≤ e−nγ , for any sufficiently large
n, where P (cn) is the distribution in (10).
2) Pe(bn) −−−−→
n→∞
0.
Furthermore, note that since the WTBC is SD, i.e., its transi-
tion probability factors as pY1,Y2,Z|X = 1{Y1=y1(X)}pY2,Z|X ,
the obtained GPBC is also SD. Namely, we have that the
GPBC’s transition probability decomposes as pY1,Y2|X,Z =
1{Y1=y1(X)}pY2|X,Z , which falls under the framework of [7,
Theorem 1].7
The converse proof of [7, Theorem 1] for the SD-GPBC
shows that under Q(bn), we have
R1 ≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
HQ(bn)(Y1,i|Zi) + ǫn (40a)
R2 ≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
IQ(bn)
(
M2, Y2,[1:i−1], Z[i+1:n];Y2,i
)
− IQ(bn)
(
M2, Y2,[1:i−1], Z[i+1:n];Zi
)]
+ǫn (40b)
R1+R2 ≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
HQ(bn)(Y1,i|Zi)
− IQ(bn)
(
M2,Y2,[1:i−1],Z[i+1:n],Y1,[i+1:n];Zi, Y2,i
)
+ IQ(bn)
(
M2,Y2,[1:i−1],Z[i+1:n],Y1,[i+1:n];Y2,i
)]
+ǫn
(40c)
where ǫn ,
2
n
+
∑
j=1,2 Rj · Pe(bn) −−−−→n→∞
0. On account of
Property (3-a) of Lemma 1, for n large we have∥∥∥P (cn)M,Y[1:i],Z[i:n] −Q(bn)M,Y[1:i],Z[i:n]∥∥∥
TV
≤
∥∥∥P (cn) −Q(bn)∥∥∥
TV
≤ e−nγ , (41)
uniformly in i ∈ [1 : n]. Combining this with (9b) from
Lemma 2, we may replace the information measures from the
6As explained in footnote 5 of Section V-1, although the definition of
WTBC achievability in [12] does explicitly requires stealth (while Definition
3 does), their proof establishes it nonetheless.
7The deterministic component Y1 of a SD-GPBC is, generally, a function
of the input-state pair (X,Z). In our case, Y1 = y1(X) depends only on the
input.
RHS of (40) that are taken with respect to Q(bn) with the
same terms, but with an underlying distribution P (cn) plus a
vanishing term. Namely, there exists a δ > 0, such that for n
large enough
R1 ≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
HP (cn)(Y1,i|Zi) + ǫn + e
−nδ (42a)
R2 ≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
IP (cn)(Vi;Y2,i)− IP (cn)(Vi;Zi)
]
+ ǫn + 2e
−nδ (42b)
R1 +R2 ≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
HP (cn)(Y1,i|Zi) + IP (cn)(Vi, Ti;Y2,i)
− IP (cn)(Vi, Ti;Y1,i, Zi)
]
+ ǫn + 3e
−nδ (42c)
where, for every i ∈ [1 : n], we have defined Vi ,(
M2, Y2,[1:i−1], Z[i+1:n]
)
P (cn)
and Ti ,
(
Y1,[i+1:n]
)
P (cn)
,
with the subscript P (cn) indicating that the underlying dis-
tribution is the one from (10).
Letting n tend to infinity in (42), we see that any achievable
pair (R1, R2) is contained in the convex closure of the union
of rate pairs satisfying
R1 ≤ Hp(Y1|Z) (43a)
R2 ≤ Ip(V ;Y2)− Ip(V ;Z) (43b)
R1 +R2 ≤ Hp(Y1|Z) + Ip(V, T ;Y2)− Ip(V, T ;Y1, Z),
(43c)
where the union is over all pV,T,X ∈ P(V × T × X ),
each inducing a joint distribution p , pV,T,XpY1,Y2,Z|X , i.e.,
(Y1, Y2, Z)−X−(V, T ) forms a Markov chain. The validity of
this Markov relation follows by observing that under P (cn), we
have (Y1,i, Y2,i, Zi)−Xi−
(
M2, Y1,[i+1:n], Y2,[1:i−1], Z[i+1:n]
)
,
for every i ∈ [1 : n].
To prove the converse part of Theorem 1, it remains to show
that there exists a (single) auxiliary random variable U , such
that for any (V, T ) it satisfies both:
Ip(V ;Y2)− Ip(V ;Z) ≤ Ip(U ;Y2)− Ip(U ;Z) (44a)
Hp(Y1|Z) + Ip(V, T ;Y2)− Ip(V, T ;Y1, Z)
≤ Hp(Y1|Z) + Ip(U ;Y2)− Ip(U ;Y1, Z). (44b)
Inspired by [7], we show that either U = V or U = (V, T )
will do. Assume first that p is such that
Ip(T ;Y2|V )− Ip(T ;Z|V ) ≤ 0, (45)
which implies Ip(T ;Y2|V )−Ip(T ;Y1, Z|V ) ≤ 0. Setting U =
V gives an equality in (44a). For (44b), we have
Hp(Y1|Z) + Ip(U ;Y2)− Ip(U ;Z, Y1)
= Hp(Y1|Z) + Ip(V, T ;Y2)− Ip(V, T ;Z, Y1)− Ip(T ;Y2|V )
+ Ip(T ;Z, Y1|V )
≥ Hp(Y1|Z) + Ip(V, T ;Y2)− Ip(V, T ;Z, Y1) (46)
where the last step follows by the implication of the hypothesis
(45). Assume that the opposite of (45) holds, i.e.,
Ip(T ;Y2|V )− Ip(T ;Z|V ) ≥ 0. (47)
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Setting U = (V, T ) satisfies (44b) with equality, while (44b)
becomes
Ip(U ;Y2)− Ip(U ;Z)
= Ip(V ;Y2)− Ip(V ;Z) + Ip(T ;Y2|V )− Ip(T ;Z|V )
≥ Ip(V ;Y2)− Ip(V ;Z) (48)
where the last inequality holds under hypothesis (47). Con-
cluding, the outer bound described by (43) is further contained
in C
(SD)
WT
(
1{Y1=y1(X)}pY2,Z|X
)
from Theorem 1, which estab-
lished the converse.
Remark 12 (Theorem 1 from [7] for Stochastic Encoders)
One important issue to address is that in [7], codes for the
GPBC were defined to have a deterministic encoder, rather
than a stochastic one as considered here. We must, therefore,
make sure that this modification does not compromise the
validity of the converse proof of Theorem 1 from [7]. Indeed,
taking a closer look at the converse (Section III in [7]), we see
that the only step that uses the encoder being deterministic is
(55), where it is claimed that
n∑
i=1
I
(
M1,M2, Z[1:i−1], Z[i+1:n],Y1,[i+1:n];Y1,i|Zi
)
=
n∑
i=1
H (Y1,i|Zi) (49a)
because “given (M1,M2, Z
n), the channel inputs Xn are de-
termined by the encoder, and hence Y n1 are also determined”.
However, since this step is a part of an upper bound (on the
sum of rates), we may replace it with
n∑
i=1
I
(
M1,M2, Z[1:i−1], Z[i+1:n],Y1,[i+1:n];Y1,i|Zi
)
≤
n∑
i=1
H (Y1,i|Zi) , (49b)
which merely uses the non-negativity of conditional entropy
and is also valid for stochastic encoders. With that minor
modification, one may proceed with the same steps from [7,
Section III] to establish the converse when stochastic encoding
is allowed.
C. Proof of Theorem 2
1) Direct: Fix a distribution pU,X ∈ P(U × X ) and let
pU,X,Y1,Y2,Z , pU,XpY1,Y2,Z|X denote the joint single-letter
distribution. We propose a superposition stealth-wiretap code
for the PD-WTBC and show that it has an exponentially
decaying error probability and effective secrecy metric (see
Definition (5)). We then use Part 2 of Proposition 1 to deduce
achievability in the sense of Definition 3.
Codebook Bn:We use a superposition codebook whereM1
and M2 are carried by the outer and inner layers, respectively.
Each layer is injected with sufficient randomness that enables
to conceal the corresponding message from the eavesdropper.
Define the index sets W
(n)
j ,
[
1 : 2nR˜j
]
, for j = 1, 2. Let
B
(n)
U ,
{
U(m2, w2)
}
(m2,w2)∈M
(n)
2 ×W
(n)
2
be a random inner
layer codebook, which is a set of random vectors of length n
that are i.i.d. according to pnU . An outcome of B
(n)
U is denoted
by B
(n)
U ,
{
u(i)
}
(m2,w2)∈M
(n)
2 ×W
(n)
2
.
To describe the outer layer codebook, fix B
(n)
U and for
every (m2, w2) ∈ M
(n)
2 × W
(n)
2 , let B
(n)
X (m2, w2) ,{
V(m1, w1|m2, w2)
}
(m1,w1)∈M
(n)
1 ×W
(n)
1
be a collection
of i.i.d. random vectors of length n with distribu-
tion qn
X|U=u(m2,w2)
. For each (m2, w2) ∈ M
(n)
2 ×
W
(n)
2 , an outcome of B
(n)
X (m2, w2) (given an inner
layer codebook B
(n)
U ) is denoted by B
(n)
X (m2, w2) ,{
v(m1, w1|m2, w2)
}
(m1,w1)∈M
(n)
1 ×W
(n)
1
. We also set BX ={
BX(m2, w2)
}
(m2,w2)∈M
(n)
2 ×W
(n)
w
and denote its realizations
by BX . Finally, a random superposition codebook is given by
Bn =
{
B
(n)
U ,B
(n)
X
}
, while Bn =
{
B
(n)
U ,B
(n)
X
}
denotes a fixed
codebook.
LetBn be the set of all possible outcomes of Bn. The above
codebook construction induces a distribution µ ∈ P(Bn) over
the codebook ensemble. For every Bn ∈ Bn, we have
µ(Bn) =
∏
(m2,w2)∈M
(n)
2 ×W
(n)
2
pnU
(
u(m2, w2)
)
×
∏
(
mˆ2,wˆ2,m1,w1
)
∈M
(n)
2 ×W
(n)
2 ×M
(n)
1 ×W
(n)
1
pnX|U
(
x
(
m1, w1|mˆ2, wˆ2
)∣∣∣u(mˆ2, wˆ2))
(50)
The encoder and both decoders are described next for a given
superposition codebook Bn ∈ Bn.
Encoder f (Bn): Given (m1,m2) ∈ M
(n)
1 × M
(n)
2 , the
encoder chooses (w1, w2) ∈ M
(n)
1 × M
(n)
2 uniformly at
random and independently of the messages. The channel
input sequence is set as x(m1, w1|m2, w2) ∈ B
(n)
X (m2, w2).
Accordingly, the (stochastic) encoding function fn : M
(n)
1 ×
M
(n)
2 → P(X
n) is
f (Bn)n (x|m1,m2)
=
1∣∣W(n)1 ∥∥W(n)2 ∣∣
∑
(w1,w2)∈W
(n)
1 ×W
(n)
2
1{
x=x(m1,w1|m2,w2)
}.
(51)
Decoder 1 φ
(Bn)
1 : Upon observing y1 ∈
Yn1 , Decoder 1 searches for a unique tuple
(mˆ1, mˆ2, wˆ1, wˆ2) ∈M
(n)
1 ×M
(n)
2 ×W
(n)
1 ×W
(n)
2 such that(
u(mˆ2, mˆ2),x(mˆ1, wˆ1|mˆ2, wˆ2),y1
)
∈ T nǫ (pU,X,Y1). If an
appropriate tuple is found, set φ
(Bn)
1 (y1) = mˆ1; otherwise
φ
(Bn)
1 (y) = 1.
Decoder 2 φ
(Bn)
2 : Upon observing y2 ∈ Y
n
2 , Decoder 2
searches for a unique pair (mˆ2, wˆ2) ∈ M
(n)
2 ×W
(n)
2 such that(
u(mˆ2, mˆ2),y2
)
∈ T nǫ (pU,Y2). The output of the decoding
function is defined as φ
(Bn)
2 (y2) = mˆ2, if a unique pair is
found, and as φ
(Bn)
2 (y2) = 1, otherwise.
The triple (f (Bn), φ
(Bn)
1 , φ
(Bn)
2 ) defined with respect to any
codebook Bn ∈ Bn constitutes an (n,R1, R2)-code cn for
the WTBC. For any codebook Bn ∈ Bn, the induced joint
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distribution is
P (Bn)(m1,m2, w1, w2,u,x,y1,y2, z, mˆ1, mˆ2)
=
1∏
j=1,2
∣∣M(n)j ∣∣∣∣W(n)j ∣∣1{u=u(m2,w2)}∩{x=x(m1,w1|m2,w2)}
× pnY1,Y2,Z|X(y1,y2, z|x)1 ⋂
j=1,2
{
mˆj=φ
(Bn)
j (yj)
}.
(52)
Set Pe(Bn) , PP (Bn)
(
(Mˆ1, Mˆ2) 6= (M1,M2)
)
as the error
probability of a code cn (induced by Bn).
Expected Probability of Error Analysis: The above de-
scribed codebook, encoder and decoders correspond to the
classic superposition coding scheme for BCs with M˜j ,
(Mj ,Wj), for j = 1, 2, in the role of the j-th message.
Via standard joint-typicality analysis of the error probability
(see, e.g, [46, Section 5.3.1]), there exists a τ1 > 0 such that
EµPe(Bn) ≤ e
−nτ1 , provided that (R1, R2) satisfy
R1 + R˜1 < Ip(X ;Y1, Z|U) (53a)
R2 + R˜2 < Ip(U ;Y2) (53b)
R1 + R˜1 +R2 + R˜2 < Ip(U,X ;Y1, Z). (53c)
Note that the sum of (53a) and (53b) gives R1 + R˜1 +R2 +
R˜2 < Ip(U ;Y2)+Ip(X ;Y1, Z|U); this makes (53c) redundant.
The redundancy is due to the assumption that the PD-WTBC
satisfies Y2 − Y1 −X , which, in turn, implies Ip(U ;Y1, Z) ≥
Ip(U ;Y1) ≥ Ip(U ;Y2).
Effective Secrecy Analysis: We analyze the expected value
of the effective secrecy metric. Let pZ be the Z-marginal of
the single-letter distribution pU,X,Y1,Y2,Z and observe that
EµD
(
P
(Bn)
M1,M2,Z
∥∥∥p(U)
M
(n)
1 ×M
(n)
2
pnZ
)
(a)
= EµD
(
P
(Bn)
Z|M1,M2
∥∥∥pnZ∣∣∣p(U)M(n)1 ×M(n)2
)
(b)
= EµD
(
P
(Bn)
Z|M1=1,M2=1
∥∥∥pnZ) (54)
where (a) is because for every Bm ∈ Bn we have P
(Bn)
M1,M2
=
p
(U)
M
(n)
1 ×M
(n)
2
and the KL divergence chain rule, while (b) uses
symmetry (with respect to (m1,m2)).
The KL divergence term on the RHS of (54) falls under the
framework of the strong soft-covering lemma for superposition
codes from [47, Lemma 1], which implies that if
R˜1 > Ip(X ;Z|U) (55a)
R˜2 > Ip(U ;Z). (55b)
then there exists τ2 > 0 such that
EµD
(
P
(Bn)
Z|M1=1,M2=1
∥∥∥pnZ) ≤ e−nτ2 .
Finalization:We have that if (R1, R2) and pU,X,Y1,Y2,Z are
such that (53a)-(53b) and (55) are satisfied, then
EµPe(Bn) ≤ e
−nτ1 (56a)
EµD
(
P
(Bn)
M1,M2,Z
∥∥∥p(U)
M
(n)
1 ×M
(n)
2
pnZ
)
≤ e−nτ2, (56b)
for all sufficiently large n. Through standard existence argu-
ments (e.g., via Markov’s inequality), we conclude that there
exists a sequence of superposition codebooks {Bn}n∈N (each
giving rise to an (n,R1, R2)-code cn with induced distribution
P (cn)) satisfying (15) from Proposition 1. Invoking Part 2 of
Proposition 1, we conclude that∥∥∥∥P (cn)M1,M2,Mˆ1,Mˆ2,Z − p(U)M(n)1 ×M(n)2 1{(Mˆ1,Mˆ2)=(M1,M2)}qnZ
∥∥∥∥
TV
≤ e−nγ , (57)
for some γ > 0 and all sufficiently large n. Applying Fourier-
Motzkin Elimination on (53a)-(53b) and (55) to eliminate R˜1
and R˜2 establishes the direct part of Theorem 2.
2) Converse: The converse proof is similar to that of The-
orem 1 (for the SD-WTBC) given in Section VI-B2. Namely,
we use the converse proof of the coding theorem for the
analogous PD-GPBC with an informed receiver [8, Theorem
3] and invoke Proposition 3 to relate it to the considered PD-
WTBC. To avoid repetitiveness, we only outline that main
steps of the derivation.
For an achievable rate pair (R1, R2) ∈ R
2
+, let {cn}n∈N be
a sequence of (n,R1, R2)-codes satisfying (11). Proposition 3
produces a sequence of (n,R1, R2)-codes {bn}n∈N for the(
X ,Y1,Y2,Z, pY1,Z|XpY2|Y1
)
PD-WTBC with an informed
receiver, each inducing a joint distribution Q(bn) (see (17))
such that: (1)
∥∥P (cn)−Q(bn)∥∥
TV
≤ e−nγ , for any sufficiently
large n; and (2) Pe(bn) −−−−→
n→∞
0.
The converse proof of Theorem 3 from [8] is given in
Section V-D therein and shows that
R1 ≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
IQ(bn)(Xi;Y1,i|M2, Y2,[1:i−1], Z[i+1:n], Zi)+ǫn
(58a)
R2 ≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
IQ(bn)
(
M2, Y2,[1:i−1], Z[i+1:n];Y2,i
)
− IQ(bn)
(
M2, Y2,[1:i−1], Z[i+1:n];Zi
)]
+ ǫn (58b)
where ǫn ,
2
n
+max{R1, R2} ·Pe(bn) −−−−→
n→∞
0. Since P (cn)
and Q(bn) are exponentially close in total variation, Lemma 2
further implies that for some δ > 0 and any n large enough
R1 ≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
IP (cn)(Xi;Y1,i|Ui, Zi) + ǫn + e
−nδ (59a)
R2 ≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
IP (cn)(Ui;Y2,i)− IP (cn)(Ui;Zi)
]
+ǫn+2e
−nδ,
(59b)
where Ui ,
(
M2, Y2,[1:i−1], Z[i+1:n]
)
P (cn)
, for i ∈ [1 : n]. The
structure of P (cn) in (10) reveals that (Y1,i, Y2,i, Zi)−Xi−Ui
forms a Markov chain for every i ∈ [1 : n]. The PD assumption
further gives that the chain Y2,i−Y1,i−(Zi, Xi, Ui) is Markov.
Letting n tend to infinity in (59) established the converse of
Theorem 2.
Remark 13 (Theorem 3 from [8] for Stochastic Encoders)
In accordance to the discussion from Remark 12, for an
analogy based converse proof of Theorem 2 to work, one
has to verify that the result of [8, Theorem 3] applies to
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stochastic encoders. Examining the steps of the proof therein
(see [8, Section V-D]), it is readily seen that the derivation
holds true regardless of whether the encoder is deterministic
or stochastic.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper formalized an analogy that connects wiretap and
GP channel coding problems. We showed that given a wiretap
model and a good sequence of stealth-wiretap codes, one
can construct an analogous GPC whose capacity upper/outer
bounds that of the WTC. Consequently, any upper/outer bound
on the GPC capacity also upper/outer bounds the secrecy-
capacity of the original WTC. This framework extends to
broadcast channels and was used to derive new WTBC ca-
pacity results. Directly extending the similarity between the
capacity expressions of the classic wiretap and GPCs (see (1)
and (2)), our obtained admissible WTBC regions correspond
to those of their GP analogs. The regions of two analogous
setups are described by the same information-theoretic bounds
on the transmission rates, but the underlying distributions
are different (albeit related). The derivations of the WTBC
secrecy-capacity results demonstrate how to use the analogy
to prove converses. We postulate that additional results can
be derived based on the analogy. Promising directions include
3-receiver WTBCs (based on GP results such as the one from
[43]) and possibly a new WTC strong converse proof based
on the strong converse for the GPC [48] (a strong converse
is known only for the degraded WTC [49], and was derived
via an active hypothesis testing technique). We leave these
explorations for future work.
Other appealing future research directions include exten-
sions of the analogy framework to additional multiuser sce-
narios, such as MACs. The cognitive GP-MAC was solved
in [50], while the cognitive wiretap MAC (WT-MAC), studied
in [51], remains an open problem. Extending the analogy to
encompass MACs could help resolving the question of the
cognitive WT-MAC’s secrecy-capacity region. Developing the
MAC analogy requires addressing several delicate issues such
as the correlation between the encoders of the cognitive WT-
MAC that is not present in the GP version of the problem. It
would also be interesting to explore an analogy framework that
accounts for the GP-WTC, i.e., a state-dependent WTC with
non-causal encoder CSI. This challenging problem received
considerable attention in recent years [47], [52]–[56]. While
various achievability claims have been derived, and although
the secrecy-capacity is known in some special cases, good
upper bounds are scarcely available. One would expect that
the analogous GPC would be driven by a pair of states: one
that corresponds to the GP-WTC’s state and the other to the
eavesdropper’s signal. Although the exact details have yet
been fully understood, we note that state-dependent channels
driven by a pair of states have several known solutions
in the literature [15], [57]. An analogy framework between
these two setups would open the door to deriving improved
(possibly tight) upper bounds of the GP-WTC’s secrecy-
capacity. Finally, since this paper only establishes a uni-
directional relation between the wiretap and GPCs, a natural
future research trajectory is to explore if and when an opposite
relation holds true.
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